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MAZEN MASRI
Partitioning historic Palestine into two states is often presented as the most
plausible solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This article examines the
potential impact of such a development on the Palestinian citizens of Israel (PCI),
primarily from the vantage point of Israel’s constitutional regime. The article
explores three fundamental aspects of the Israeli constitutional system—its
instability, the “Jewish and democratic” definition of the state, and the exclusion
of the PCI from “the people” as the unit that holds sovereignty—and argues that
the envisaged two-state solution will only reinforce the definition of Israel as a
Jewish state and consequently provide further justification for the infringement
on the rights of its Palestinian citizens.
A LOT OF INK has been spilled on the topic of the two-state solution. Most of the literature focuses
on specific topics such as the economy, water, or security. In discussions of other questions such
as citizenship and human rights, attention has largely been directed at possible solutions to the
Palestinian refugee problem, often described as one of the most complicated and contentious of all
the issues to be settled. The right of Palestinian refugees to return to towns and villages of origin that
are now part of Israel would challenge the underlying premise of the two-state model, namely the
separation of Palestinians and Israelis into two distinct geographical areas. The quip, “we are here, and
they are there,” was a neat summing up of the problem by former Israeli prime minister and defense
minister Ehud Barak.1 But what would be the impact of the two-state solution on the Palestinian
citizens of Israel (PCI) who constitute 20 percent of the country’s population? By and large, this
question has remained peripheral to examinations of the two-state solution and little attention has
been devoted to the PCI.
Academics such as philosopher Asa Kasher and sociologist Sammy Smooha have argued that the
creation of a Palestinian state will ipso facto eliminate the current discrimination against the PCI.2
Others, like Nadim Rouhana and Oren Yiftachel, do not share their optimism and anticipate that
the PCI’s exclusion from Israeli power centers and from the state’s character or identity will
persist largely unchanged.3 This article assesses the potential outcome of a two-state solution for
the PCI focusing mostly on the effect of such a settlement on the Israeli constitutional regime and,
more specifically, the implications of such a solution for the strong ethnic underpinning of that
regime. The argument developed here is that the creation of a Palestinian state would actually give
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Israel more room to assert and emphasize its Jewish character at the expense of the PCI, rendering
their citizenship even more flawed, and exacerbating the current state of inequality between Jewish
and Palestinian citizens of Israel. The article provides supporting evidence for the argument at hand
by referencing both Israeli leaders’ statements regarding the future political rights of the PCI and
patterns in legislation adopted or under discussion in the Knesset. The conclusion is based on an
examination of aspects of the Israeli constitutional system that impact the PCI and their relation
to the state directly, as well as the likely repercussions entailed by the creation of a Palestinian state.
Israel’s Constitutional Regime: Problems and Challenges
Israel’s constitutional system has a direct impact on the PCI and their relationship to the state, as
manifested in the following three arenas: the constitutional system’s instability; the constitutional
definition of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic” state; and the exclusion of the PCI from “the
people,” the political unit with the power to shape the constitution. Although they are closely
interrelated, these three elements will be analyzed separately in order to shed a clearer light on
the implications of a two-state settlement for the PCI.
Constitutional instability in the current context means simply the unwillingness or inability of the
various political actors (whether political parties or successive Knessets and governments) to make
determinations on key constitutional questions and policy directions, relying instead on temporary
arrangements that are meant to maintain the status quo or on compromises that obviate the
emergence of winners and losers. This is one of the reasons why Israel has not adopted a formal
constitution. This inability or unwillingness to make determinations on key constitutional
questions usually results in a lack of clarity and stability.
Constitutional instability can be traced back to the origins of the state. According to the Declaration
of the Establishment of the State of Israel, issued on 14May 1948, an elected Constituent Assembly was
to draw up a constitution for the newly formed state. Before the Constituent Assembly was elected in
1949, the Provisional Council of State decided that the Constituent Assembly would act as both
constituent assembly and legislature. The Constituent Assembly—later renamed the First Knesset—
held discussions on the constitution without making any final decisions. Instead, it tasked the
Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee of the Knesset with preparing a draft constitution. It also
resolved that the constitution would be made up of several chapters, each of which would comprise a
separate Basic Law and all of which would subsequently be incorporated into a formal constitution.
Before its dissolution in 1951, the First Knesset passed legislation providing for all subsequent
Knessets to have the same powers, including the power to act as a constituent assembly. Thus the
Knesset preserved its constitution-making powers while simultaneously deferring action on key
constitutional issues pertaining to the nature of the state.4
Since that time, the Knesset has enacted twelve Basic Laws but Israel remains without a full
formal constitution. Historically, the failure to adopt a constitution can be explained by a number
of factors, most notably the desire of the ruling elites represented by Mapai (an earlier incarnation
of today’s Labor Party) to ensure that political power in the hands of the Knesset and the
executive remained free of constitutional restrictions.5 But there were also other reasons, including
The Two-State Model and Israeli Constitutionalism
8 || Journal of Palestine Studies
This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Thu, 22 Oct 2015 19:43:01 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
the new state’s unwillingness or inability to decide on key issues such as the role of religion,
its relationship with the Palestinian minority, or its own economic orientation,6 all highly
contentious subjects. Instead, many of these arrangements were determined through temporary
measures that mainly aim at maintaining the status quo. While some areas of disagreement (such
as the nature of the economy) were later determined, others persist, contributing further to
constitutional instability. Today, such disagreements are exemplified by the extreme polarization
between religious and more secular forces, especially on the question of “who is a Jew,” and the
still-unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which because of its nature as a conflict between a
native population and a settler-colonial state has a strong impact on shaping the state and its
constitutional order.
There are at least two dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that pertain directly to the
constitutional order in Israel: the state’s very territory, which remains undefined; and the
definition and character of Israel as a Jewish state, which, for the Palestinians in Israel, translates
into a colonial reality in every aspect of life. In the early 1990s, and after decades of seemingly
successful short-term constitutional arrangements, two important events took place. The first was
the enactment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom in 1992 and Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation in 1994, followed by a Supreme Court decision declaring Basic Laws to have
constitutional status and establishing the Court’s power to strike down legislation that violated
any rights under those laws.7 This process was seen as the culmination of a push for the adoption
of a constitution that was triggered by political and social changes in Israel, including the advent
of neoliberal economic policies.8 The second event was the launch of negotiations that culminated
in the interim agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) known
as the Oslo accords. This development marked a new era of growing tensions within Israeli
society itself: over the competing claims of ethno-nationalism and democracy between supporters
of a two-state solution and their opponents who rejected relinquishing control of the occupied
Palestinian territories, and on the question of the role of religion, specifically Judaism, in the state.
The increasing tensions, which exacerbated the instability of the Israeli constitutional system,
were brought into sharp focus by subsequent attempts to create a formal constitution, especially
on the part of civil society organizations such as the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) and the
Institute of Zionist Strategies.9 The Knesset’s Law, Constitution, and Justice Committee also tackled
the issue for three years, compiling draft provisions for inclusion in an eventual constitution.10 All
of these attempts have stressed the need for more stability in the Israeli constitutional system as an
important reason to adopt a formal constitution. Prominent academics have also asserted that
existing constitutional arrangements are inadequate and require greater stability.
A number of Basic Laws define Israel as a “Jewish and democratic” state and the most elaborate
discussion of the meaning of the Jewish state is to be found in the Supreme Court’s Tibi decision.11
Writing the majority opinion, then Chief Justice Aharon Barak outlined the “core” characteristics
that shape the minimum requirements of a Jewish state. He stated that:
These characteristics are derived from Zionism and Jewish heritage. At their core stands the right
of every Jew to immigrate to the State of Israel, where the Jews will constitute a majority; Hebrew
is the official and principal language of the State and most of its holidays and symbols reflect the
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national revival of the Jewish People. The heritage of the Jewish People is a central component of
its [the State’s] religious and cultural legacy.12
In the same decision, the Court stressed that the Jewish definition of the state did not entail
discrimination against the Palestinian minority in Israel. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding its
protestations, the Court’s pronouncement reflected the evident tensions and contradictions in the
definition: on the one hand, the democratic notion and its necessary implication of equal treatment
for all citizens and, on the other, the Jewish requirement implying exclusivity.
The strong emphasis on the religious and ethnocentric definition of the state in the Basic Laws
and other laws has serious implications for the limits and the protection of constitutional rights,
and human rights in general. For example, Israel’s values as a “Jewish and democratic” state are a
relevant factor in determining the constitutionality of legislation. According to Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Freedom, legislation can be declared unconstitutional if it infringes on the rights to
life, bodily integrity, dignity, property, personal liberty, privacy, and citizens’ entry to and exit from
the country, as well as other rights derived from these rights. But the same Basic Law provides a set
of conditions that, if met, renders eventual rights-infringing legislation constitutional. One of the
main conditions prescribed under the law’s “limitation clause” (section 8) stipulates that such
infringement is acceptable if it befits Israel’s values as a “Jewish and democratic state.” A similar
provision (section 4) exists in the 1994 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which places the
Jewishness of the state, and the components attendant to it, at the center of the process for
deciding the constitutionality of legislation. The Jewishness of the state also plays a role in the
process of interpretation of legislation. As Barak wrote shortly before retiring from the Supreme
Court, a proper interpretative approach should be one that assumes “that the general purpose of
every legal text is to fulfill Israel’s values as a Jewish and Democratic state.”13
These tensions are especially evident in relation to the question of equal rights. The right to
equality was deliberately excluded from Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom14 and is therefore
not protected to the same degree as other rights. Under this Basic Law, equality is protected as a
derivative of the right to dignity and the only aspects of equality given constitutional protection are
those that are recognized as “closely and objectively related” to the right to dignity.15 Since equality
does not stand as a constitutional right on its own and only limited aspects of it are protected,
equality enjoys weak constitutional protection.
Although they were enacted to strengthen the protection accorded to human rights, the two Basic
Laws under discussion marked the beginning of a growing trend emphasizing the Jewish character of
the state, which became the new public ethos and the public agenda’s foremost item. Such emphasis on
the “Jewish and democratic” formula has created what has been termed a “New Zionist Hegemony” by
prominent scholars in the field. Nadim Rouhana and Nimer Sultany describe this as “a new consensus
within Israeli society in support of new discriminatory policies and practices toward the Palestinian
minority” which has erected boundaries for citizenship and democracy limiting the margins that had
hitherto resisted the ethno-religious definition.16 Paradoxically, then, the advent of a human rights
discourse in Israeli constitutionalism did not signal an exception to the ethnic principle but was
inherent to it.17 Thus, what began as a push for constitutionalizing the protection of human rights
produced an emphasis on ethnicity, creating an environment and a mindset that, under the cover of
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liberal human rights, normalizes and justifies discriminatory practices against the PCI. While there
were some developments that could be seen as promoting equality such as Ka’dan,18 these were
accompanied by a strong legal emphasis on the Jewish values of the state. A deeper analysis and
critical reading of such developments points to the ethnic principle setting the ceiling for the rights
PCI can enjoy.19
In addition to the problematic question of exclusion, the tensions arising from the “Jewish and
democratic” definition of the state also impinge on policy areas such as immigration, land
allocation, and the ability to participate in electoral politics, subject areas that are directly related
to the “core” characteristics of the Jewish state as identified by Barak. While often denied or
downplayed by leading Israeli academics and by the Supreme Court, legal scholars, especially
those of the liberal Zionist persuasion, admit to certain tensions in the “Jewish and democratic”
definition. To overcome the problem and justify the contradictions, they deploy the principle of
the “nation-state,” whereby a state is designated as the embodiment of the right to self-
determination of a specific national group as opposed to one where the nation consists of the
citizens.20 Such a state, they argue, is allowed to favor the preferences of the dominant national
group, and so long as minority groups living in that state belong to a group that is favored in any
state, the preferential treatment of the majority citizens is not unjust and does not amount to
illegitimate discrimination. Following this line of reasoning, Israel is justified in according Jews
favorable treatment congruent with its designation as the Jewish nation-state. For these scholars,
this situation would be flawed only if the Palestinians in Israel did not have another place where
they could exercise their right to self-determination. Thus, these scholars assert, the creation of
such a state, under the putative two-state solution, where Palestinians (including the PCI) could
exercise their right to self-determination, would resolve many of the tensions and contradictions
inherent in Israel’s definition as a Jewish state.
This is the position that is marshaled in discussions surrounding the Law of Return, a law that
favors Jewish immigrants and grants them automatic Israeli citizenship as a matter of right.
Although essentially pertaining to immigration policy, the Law of Return is seen as a pillar of Israeli
law because of its crucial role in shaping the character of the state. Some, like Barak, see it as part of
the constitutional order.21 The Law of Return essentially provides for a discriminatory immigration
policy. Although the discrimination here is against noncitizens who wish to acquire Israeli
citizenship (mainly Palestinian refugees), it is still discriminatory toward the PCI in that it favors one
national group and disregards the needs and interests of the other.22 Justifying this discriminatory
outcome, some liberal Zionist theorists argue that such legislation is acceptable in nation-states and
that the creation of the Palestinian state, which would presumably enact a similar law giving
Palestinians favorable treatment comparable to that given to Jews under the Law of Return, would
eliminate the discriminatory nature of the Israeli law.23 Thus, the argument goes, both nations (Jews
and Palestinians) can enjoy favorable treatment under the immigration policy of their respective
nation-states. This argument is often extended to other arenas, including those of national rights
and, to some extent, political rights. There are some who go even further and assert that the PCI
should exercise some of their individual rights inside the future Palestinian state: for example, the
right to family life, if it entails what is known as family reunification, whereby a Palestinian citizen of
Israel cannot legally live with a Palestinian spouse who is not a PCI.24
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Thus, the justification for restricting rights is based on the argument that Israel is the
“nation-state” of the Jewish people and not of the Palestinian people and that Palestinians
who are citizens of Israel will potentially be able to exercise those (currently restricted) rights
in their own future state. Hence, according to this argument, the future creation of the
“nation-state of Palestine” justifies restricting the national and political rights of the PCI
presently and will eventually eliminate the tension in the state’s definition. While these
observations are mainly based on the theoretical writings of scholars, such a position is no
longer confined to the realm of theoretical debate and is making its way into the legal
reasoning of the courts. For example, one of the justifications advanced by the Supreme Court
for limiting the right of Palestinian citizens to family reunification has been that the
constitutional right to enjoy family life does not mean exercising that right in Israel. As long
as citizens can exercise the right somewhere, it is not a violation of the right to family life if
they cannot reunify with their family in Israel. While the Court appears to be applying this
restrictive understanding of the right to all Israeli citizens, and not just the PCI, it is clear
from the reasoning, the context, as well as the constitutional and legislative frameworks, that
this restriction applies only to the PCI.25
The third aspect of the Israeli constitutional system that is relevant to this discussion is the
question of sovereignty (in its internal sense) and constituent power, more specifically, the extent
to which the PCI are seen as partners in the “constituent power” of the sovereign people. Many
constitutional theorists highlight popular sovereignty as the basis for constitutional regimes that
are democratic: in other words, it is “the people” or the nation that is the sovereign. This
conception of popular sovereignty as the source of legitimacy for the constitutional order, wherein
sovereignty rests in “the people,” is widely accepted among constitutional and political theorists.
This question is especially important in the case under consideration since the Jewish definition
is also construed to mean that Israel is the state of the Jewish people and the embodiment of their
self-determination (including those Jews who are not in Israel).26 Thus, the situation arises in
which the interests of individuals who are not, and have never been, citizens of the state are taken
into consideration while those of a significant proportion (one-fifth) of the state’s citizens—the
PCI—are not. If popular sovereignty is one of the manifestations of democracy, and “the people”
are the ultimate source of authority—an assertion that is widely accepted by Israel’s constitutional
theorists and by its Supreme Court—then who exactly is included in “the people”?27
The Supreme Court recognizes that when it enacts Basic Laws the Knesset exercises constituent
power and that such power is derived from “the people” in which sovereignty rests. But nowhere is
“the people” defined. Whenever the term “the people” is used, it usually refers to “the Jewish people.”
Even in case law, exactly what constitutes “the people” remains unclear. On the one hand, former
Chief Justice Barak has stated that the “minimal” characteristics of democracy “are based on the
recognition of the sovereignty of the people, which is expressed in free and equal elections.”28
While “the people” in this case might be the collective that has the right to vote, that is, the
citizens, the access to citizenship reflected in Israel’s immigration policy and the restrictions on
the right to participate in the elections to those who recognize the Jewish nature of the state cast
doubt on who “the people” are. On the other hand, Justice Rubenstein asserted in a recent ruling
that “the Jewish people has won sovereignty after two thousand years of exile, and [the] Jewish
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sovereignty is a deposit that is the most precious in the Jewish history.”29 He also describes the state
as “Jewish and democratic sovereignty.”30 Furthermore, the courts have ruled on a number of
occasions that there is no such thing as an Israeli nation or people.31
While the discussion on constituent power and popular sovereignty may remain somewhat
theoretical until Israel seriously embarks on the process of adopting a formal constitution,
a number of signs already indicate that the PCI will be excluded from the process. To begin with,
Palestinian citizens of Israel have been effectively kept out of forums that are working informally
to negotiate a constitution. Thus, the drafting committee under the IDI’s initiative included no
PCI although a few featured in early discussions.32 And the Knesset’s Law, Constitution, and
Justice Committee, which discussed a draft constitution from 2003 to 2006, included only one
Palestinian member of Knesset (MK) who in any case boycotted most of the sessions and did not
vote on the final resolution. Also telling is the fact that the special website created for this
initiative (with support from the Jewish Agency) was translated into English in order “to appeal to
the worldwide Jewish community and invite their input on central constitutional issues.” No word
of the initiative appeared in Arabic.33 The fact that the involvement of Jewish communities
worldwide was emphasized also further blurs the contours of “the people.” The insistence on
the “Jewish and democratic” definition and Israel’s unwillingness to entertain other options,
despite the fact that this definition excludes the PCI, the refusal to adopt a more inclusive and
more democratic definition such as the “state for all its citizens,” and painting demands for more
inclusionary definitions as a form of “political extremism” all reinforce the notion that the
Palestinians are essentially excluded from these debates.34
Two-State Solution: Stabilization of the Constitutional System
and Outcome for the PCI
It is difficult to anticipate the exact details of a final two-state settlement—if it ever occurs.
Indeed, there are many reasons to believe that such a solution is unlikely for a number of reasons,
not least of which is the increasing power of Israel’s nationalist religious right as well as the settler
movement in Israel and the occupied territories. Nevertheless, the general contours of such a
settlement are fairly clear. For the purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to get into the
minutiae of a potential two-state agreement; what is relevant here are the larger issues of
constitutional design and their impact on human rights.
The focus here will be on three points related to an eventual two-state solution: first, the formula
of “two states for two peoples,” the main premise of such a settlement; second, Israel’s demand that
the Palestinians recognize the Jewish nature of the state; and third, the demand that any agreement
must include an “end of conflict” clause.
The “two-state” framework and the formula “two states for two peoples” emphasize the ethnic
(and, for Israel, the religious) character of each state. Accordingly, Israel would be the state of the
Jewish people—including those Jews who are not Israeli citizens—and would not be the state of
Israeli citizens who are not Jewish. Conversely, the future Palestinian state would be “the nation-
state” of the Palestinian people, including those Palestinians who are Israeli citizens. Successive
Israeli governments have emphasized Israel’s Jewish character in the context of the two-state
The Two-State Model and Israeli Constitutionalism
Summer 2015 || 13
This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Thu, 22 Oct 2015 19:43:01 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
settlement, stating at times that such a description is an Israeli demand for any negotiated agreement
to be reached.35
While the PLO has never officially endorsed the formula of “two states for two peoples,” it seems
to have accepted it implicitly. This can be inferred from a number of facts. First, the PLO has never
rejected the formula and, in some situations, PLO negotiators have even used it.36 Second, the PLO
has never protested its use by U.S. and other representatives in statements they made in the context
of negotiations.37 Thirdly, the willingness of the Palestinian leadership to demonstrate flexibility on
the right of return of Palestinian refugees would indicate that the underlying logic of the formula
(that is, separation) has been accepted by the PLO leadership. In any case, even if the eventual
agreement does not explicitly mention “two states for two peoples,” in the context of Israel’s
domestic politics and constitutional identity, the two-state formula is generally seen as justifying
and reinforcing the ethnic/religious identity of Israel.
From a liberal Zionist standpoint, the creation of a Palestinian state would also impact the three
aspects of Israeli constitutional order discussed earlier. The kind of settlement that creates a
“Palestinian nation-state” alongside its “Jewish equivalent” will provide justifications for accepting
Israel exclusively as the “nation-state” of the Jewish people, with all of the negative implications
that this would carry for the PCI. It would not only help “legitimize Israel as a Jewish state,” but
“would lend a sense of symmetry to the situation.”38 According to this understanding, since the
future Palestinian state would give Palestinians preferential rights in areas such as immigration—
and a physical place for Palestinians (including the PCI) to “return to” or “immigrate”—some of
the tensions arising from the discriminatory nature of Israel’s Law of Return would be resolved.
Additionally, the future Palestinian state would be the proper place for Palestinians to exercise
their national rights and, possibly, some political and individual rights, and therefore the restriction
of such rights in Israel would be justified. Such an outcome would be particularly problematic
because it would essentially equate the Palestinians in Israel, who are an indigenous group, with
an immigrant community, disregarding the historic events that led to the displacement and
dispossession of the Palestinians in the first place. Following this line of reasoning, then, the two-
state formula would neutralize any potential discriminatory effect of the definition of Israel as a
Jewish state, justify the exclusion of the Palestinian citizens of Israel from the sovereign “people,”
and be used to override their opposition to Israel’s definition. Furthermore, it would help stabilize
the constitutional regime since it would resolve some of the reasons for instability, especially the
tension between ethno-nationalism and democracy and would go some way to settling the debate
between the proponents of a “Greater Israel” and the supporters of the two-state solution. A two-
state settlement would, however, have little impact on the tension related to the role of the religion
in the state. This will, predictably, continue to be a source of tension and likely instability,
especially in light of the growing proportion of religious Jews among Israel’s population. Indeed,
the creation of a Palestinian state might even lead to an exacerbation of the problem as it is likely
to further radicalize the religious fringe.
An international agreement in which Israel is officially recognized as a Jewish state will also have
implications domestically in Israel. It would constitute recognition by the Palestinians’ official
representatives (the PLO) that Israel has a right to define itself as a Jewish state, something that
might be used to counter the PCIs’ own rejection of the Jewish definition. The Jewish state
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recognition might lend further support and weight to the contention that it is not necessary for
the PCI to consent to constitutional arrangements regarding the character of the state since
the definition has been endorsed in an international agreement by the Palestinians’ official
representatives, the PLO. The position of the PLO on this matter is not entirely consistent: it
ranges from absolute rejection of the idea to expressions of flexibility and willingness to accept
whatever official name Israel wishes to confer upon itself, including its self-characterization as
“Jewish.”
Finally, the inclusion of an “end of claims” clause in any negotiated agreement, as demanded by
Israel, would also have grave repercussions for the PCI. Such a clause would block any attempts to
seek redress for past injustices that were committed against the Palestinians in Israel, and
especially those related to the 1948 war. One example is a distinct group among the Palestinians
of Israel, those who were internally displaced in 1948 and who continue to demand the right to
return to their villages of origin and the restitution of their property. Although this is ostensibly a
matter between the state and its citizens, an international agreement containing an “end of
claims” clause might constitute an obstacle to addressing such efforts.
If, as discussed above, the mere idea of a hypothetical Palestinian state to mirror the Jewish state
is seen as sufficient justification for discriminatory policies and practices in Israel today, what, might
one ask, would be the effect of the existence of an actual Palestinian state? The existence of such a
state is expected to justify a greater emphasis on the “Jewish” part of the definition of Israel as
“Jewish and democratic” and the corollary downplaying of the definition’s democratic component.
Since the potential and future creation of a Palestinian state is used today to justify current
violations of the right to equality and other collective rights of the Palestinians in Israel or at least
used to deny that such rights are violated, once such a state exists in reality, it can only be
expected that the emphasis placed on the Jewish character of Israel at the expense of the non-
Jewish Palestinian minority will grow even greater.
Such a development is likely to be resisted, however. Since 1948, the PCI have consistently opposed
the racist laws and policies that seek to perpetuate their inferior status. Such opposition and resistance
have intensified since 2000, when the Israeli Border Police killed thirteen PCI at the beginning of
the second intifada, prompting Israeli observers to warn against the “radicalization” of the PCI. The
issue of the Jewish character of the state and associated policies related to equal citizenship, land
rights, and cultural autonomy have been at the center of the political debate among political parties
and activists ever since. When the Knesset and Israeli civil society organizations debated adopting a
constitution that entrenches the Jewish definition of the state, Palestinian civil society organizations
responded with several position papers and a proposal for a democratic and pluralistic constitution.
In addition to the Israeli legal system, the PCI use international legal fora to counter discriminatory
policies and practices, as was evident most recently in the international campaign to oppose the
Prawer Plan calling for the displacement and dispossession of tens of thousands of bedouin from
the Negev and their resettlement in Israeli-designated locations.
Such actions demonstrate that the PCI are by no means passive actors. Growing institutionalized
discrimination will undoubtedly cause greater resistance on the part of the PCI and the redoubling of
their efforts to internationalize the issue. At the same time, the scope and effectiveness of their
opposition, as well as the strategies they might deploy, are hard to predict, as are the position of
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the PLO and the role it might play. It would be reasonable to assume that since the status of the
PCI is not on the negotiations agenda and it is treated by Israel as an internal/domestic matter, the
PLO’s ability to influence the PCI’s situation will likely remain limited. It is probable that the PLO
will sidestep such discussions in order to make headway on other issues.
Other Indications of Poor Outcome for PCI
In June 2008, Tzipi Livni, then Israel’s foreign minister, stated, “once a Palestinian state is
established, I can come to the Palestinian citizens, whom we call Israeli Arabs, and say to them
‘you are citizens with equal rights, but the national solution for you is elsewhere.’”39 Similar
statements were also attributed to Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu shortly after the
permanent status negotiations were temporarily resumed in September 2010.40 But it is Avigdor
Lieberman, leader of the Yisrael Beytenu party and Israel’s former foreign minister, who has made
the most direct mention of Israel’s Palestinians and their rights in the context of international
negotiations. In 2010, he stated that “the question of Israel’s [Palestinian] citizens needs to be one
of the central issues on the negotiating table, in light of the Palestinian refusal to recognize Israel
as a Jewish state.”41 He further likened a potential peace agreement that does not deal with the
issue of the PCI to a situation where “someone sells you a flat and then demands that his mother-
in-law continues to live there.” This statement was issued by a senior minister with no rebuttal or
retraction from any other official source.
The idea of land swaps between Israel and the future Palestinian state is often portrayed as an
acceptable solution to the problem of West Bank settlement blocs, the assumption being that the
future state would get land equal in area to the land on which the settlements are erected, with
these being transferred to Israeli sovereignty. A number of voices in Israel have suggested the
inclusion in such land swaps of Palestinian towns close to the Green Line that are currently part
of Israel “proper.” For the inhabitants of those towns, this would mean voluntarily relinquishing
their Israeli citizenship, or being stripped of it, and acquiring a (future) Palestinian citizenship.
While this kind of thinking is often associated with Lieberman and his party,42 calls to include
inhabited land swaps in a peace agreement are not limited to the extreme right. In negotiations
with the PLO as far back as 2008, the centrist Livni raised the same prospect.43
“Permanent status negotiations” have been held between Israel and the PLO in the past, and it is
expected that these will resume at some point in the event of a negotiated settlement. Israel negotiates
as a sovereign state defined as the state of the Jewish people and Israeli leaders have repeatedly
declared that their goal is to achieve a two-state agreement which will secure Israel’s Jewish
character and majority. As explained earlier, this entails restricting some of the rights of the PCI,
especially their right to equality. In this context, Israeli interests, defined as those of the Jewish
majority, stand at odds with the interests of the PCI. It would be convenient to consider the PCI
as being represented by the PLO but in reality, the PLO does not represent them, whether
formally or informally, and the current leadership does not claim to do so, leaving the PCI
without any representation in international negotiations despite the fact that any future peace
agreement will fundamentally impact their rights and lives.
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Furthermore, a plethora of bills introduced in the Knesset infringe exceptionally on the PCI’s
rights. These bills, which are progressively being enacted into legislation, seek to force Palestinians
in Israel to accept the Jewish definition and to target those who might actively challenge it. One
such example is the 2008 amendment to the Citizenship Law, which expedites the process of
revoking the citizenship of any person seen as disloyal to the state.44 In the explanatory note to
the bill before the Knesset, the initiators made clear that the impetus for the measure was to
address “expressions of sympathy by Israeli citizens with the enemies of the state and with terror
organizations”—at the time, a reference to expressions of solidarity with the Lebanese people
during the summer 2006 war.45 In addition, private members’ bills were introduced to make further
changes. One bill sought to add acting “against the State of Israel being a Jewish, Zionist and
Democratic state” as grounds for revoking citizenship,46 and another bill provided that a pledge of
allegiance to Israel as a “Jewish and Zionist state” must be a condition for naturalization,47 and even
for the acquisition of an official ID card.48 Legislation has also been enacted to limit the ability to
commemorate the Nakba. A 2011 law gives the minister of finance the power to cut funding to any
government-funded bodies such as municipalities or schools that contribute to activities that could
be seen as challenging Israel’s definition as a Jewish state or that mark as a day of mourning the
day when Israel was created.49 Laws have also been enacted to restrict the freedom of PCI to choose
their place of residence.50
Such fervently ethno-nationalist bills and legislation have been on the rise in recent years and
most seek to question the status of the PCI and place further restrictions on them. While many
are private members’ bills that may never become law, their sheer volume and frequency highlight
the trend in Israel’s political discourse to constrain the citizenship of a certain group of people
and reinforce the ethnic character of Israeli citizenship, whether on the legislative or constitutional
level. Such a trend bodes ill for the PCI.
There are other factors that further support the suggestion that a two-state settlement will likely
have a negative impact for the PCI. The relocation of settlers is one example. A significant number of
West Bank settlers are right-wing extremists who terrorize the surrounding Palestinian villages and
towns, making what is called “settler violence” an everyday occurrence. These acts of violence have
been expanding beyond theWest Bank, and the vigilante groups responsible have been targeting PCI
towns as part of what is known as “price-tag” activities—violent actions by settlers “charging” a price
for measures taken by the Israeli government against settlements (such as illegal construction, for
example).51
Relocation of these settlers, if it happens, will be to the Negev and the Galilee, which are designated
as priority areas for (Jewish) development and settlement. It is widely expected that settler opposition
to the creation of a Palestinian state and their anger at being forced to relocate will translate into
violence and harassment of Palestinians in the areas to which they are moved. The city of ‘Akka
(Acre) is a case in point: when the “Disengagement Plan” of 2005 saw the evacuation of settlers
from the Gaza Strip and their relocation to ‘Akka, a city with a sizable Palestinian minority, some
joined a religious youth school that combines religious studies with military service, known as
Yeshivat Hesder.52 This yeshiva in particular was founded in 2003 “to preserve the city’s Jewish
majority.”53 The flow of religious extremists to the city, especially to areas with a high proportion of
Palestinian residents, aggravated existing tensions and culminated in violent confrontations in 2008.54
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A settlement based on the two-state model according to the formula of two states for two peoples
will not solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. If anything, it is likely to intensify the conflict, albeit in a
different way. While providing the Israeli constitutional system a degree of stability, such a
settlement would emphasize the ethno-religious character of Israel and, from a liberal Zionist
point of view, it would absolve the state from seriously considering the will and interests of
the PCI in any future constitution-making process. Given the PCI’s lack of representation in
international negotiations, and in light of recent trends in the Knesset, as well as the increasingly
inflammatory statements of Israeli leaders on the subject, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that
the two-state model will further infringe on the rights of the PCI.
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